Explaining away is a common pattern of reasoning in which the con rmation of one cause of an observed or believed event reduces the need to invoke alternative causes. The opposite of explaining away also can occur, in which the con rmation of one cause increases belief in another. We provide a general qualitative probabilistic analysis of intercausal reasoning, and identify the property of the interaction among the causes, product synergy, that determines which form of reasoning is appropriate. Product synergy extends the qualitative probabilistic network (QPN) formalism to support qualitative intercausal inference about the directions of change in probabilistic belief. The intercausal relation also justi es Occam's razor, facilitating pruning in search for likely diagnoses.
to defeasible acceptance of sprinkling. In a default reasoning scheme, con rmation of rain should lead to a retraction of the hypothesis that the sprinkler had been on. In a probabilistic reasoning scheme, it should lead to a reduced probability of the sprinkler hypothesis, even though the possibility of simultaneous sprinkling and rain is allowed. This common and intuitively compelling pattern of reasoning is called explaining away, because one cause explains the observed e ect and so reduces the need to invoke other causes. This qualitative pattern of reasoning is entirely compatible with Bayesian inference when probabilistic in uences re ect causal relationships 3, 9] . It is also the essence of Occam's razor: slice away hypotheses that are unnecessary to account for the evidence. Indeed, Paek 8] applies minimization of causal justi cations to realize the explaining away pattern in a circumscriptive logic. Pearl 9] uses the revealed asymmetry of inference with respect to causal direction to argue for incorporating causal relations in default reasoning schemes. Although inference rules implementing explaining away have been well studied 2, 9], precise and general conditions under which this pattern is valid have not appeared in the literature. Pearl provides these conditions for the special case of linear/Gaussian models 10, page 351]. Ge ner provides a probabilistic justi cation of explaining away in terms of -semantics 1]. Both of these demonstrations are illustrative, but do not capture the full range of situations in which such inference is appropriate.
Explaining away is an example of intercausal inference 3]|that is, reasoning between two causes with a common e ect|in contrast with pure causal or pure evidential reasoning. Although explaining away is often intuitively compelling, there are cases in which it appears inappropriate. Consider the following example, illustrated by the causal model of Figure 2 . You notice this newspaper headline about a well-known politician: \Senator Jones Killed in Car Accident." You idly wonder whether she might have been drunk. The headline gives no indication of whether she was at fault in the accident, or even whether she was a driver or passenger. You had no previous information about her driving or drinking habits, but you know that alcohol is a major cause of fatal car accidents. Reading on, you nd out that Jones was indeed the driver and that no other vehicle was involved in the accident. How does this new information a ect your belief that she had been drinking? Without knowledge of any accident, the fact that the Senator was driving might reduce the suspicion that she had been drinking. Given the accident, however, the fact that she was the driver would increase the suspicion. Note that this pattern of plausible reasoning is the opposite of explaining away: Knowledge of a common e ect renders a positive dependence between the causes, even though the causes were independent or even negatively dependent a priori.
The goal of this paper is to provide a general analysis of intercausal reasoning that accounts for both of the illustrated patterns of reasoning, and that makes precise the conditions di erentiating them. Our choice of a probabilistic approach re ects the uncertainty central to causal explanation tasks, and is supported by the observation that explaining away is a natural consequence of some generic structures commonly employed in probabilistic modeling.
Although the probabilistic formulation refers to quantitative degrees of belief, it does not necessarily require precise numerical probabilities for application. Indeed, our analysis is qualitative, concerning the direction|but not the magnitude|of probabilistic dependencies. Our premise is that the critical distinctions correspond to intuitive categories of interaction among causes, and that further precision would be impractical or less convenient and, for many purposes, unnecessary. This position is supported by the observation that common vocabulary includes numerous qualitative concepts of causal interaction. For example, we often say that causal factors act inde- pendently or synergistically, that one cause (a \gating condition") enables or inhibits another, or that a set of available inputs are complementary or substitutable with one another. Rain and sprinkling independently cause wet grass; drinking ampli es the causal relation between driving and car accidents.
We formalize these concepts using the qualitative probabilistic network (QPN) representation 15], an abstraction of Bayesian networks. The analysis of intercausal reasoning extends this formalism by introducing new qualitative characterizations of causal interactions, complementary with the existing QPN synergy relations.
In the remainder of this paper, we present a formal analysis of qualitative intercausal relations. After reviewing the notion of qualitative probabilistic in uence in Section 2, in Section 3 we analyze intercausal reasoning with uncertain causal in uences, and identify the conditions for explaining away to occur. We generalize these conditions in Section 4 to handle prior intercausal relationships and partial evidence on the e ect. Finally, in Section 5 we present a view of Occam's razor suggested by intercausal relations.
Qualitative Probabilistic Networks
Our analysis of intercausal inference under uncertainty is based on the QPN formalism for qualitative probabilistic reasoning 15]. In a qualitative probabilistic network, variables are represented as nodes in a graph, with directed edges de ning prob-4 abilistic relationships. As in Bayesian networks 10] and other graphical schemes, connectedness in the graph represents the dependency structure of the underlying probability distribution 11]. However, rather than specify the distribution precisely with numeric probability tables, QPNs merely constrain the conditional probabilities using qualitative in uences.
Associated with each edge is a sign, 2 f+; ?; 0; ?g, denoting the direction of qualitative in uence between nodes. Figure 3 depicts an example QPN representing beliefs about the health of a friend. Event A, that our friend has a cold, increases 2 the probability of C, that he is sneezing. Event B, that he has an allergic reaction, also increases this probability. On the other hand, event F, that he recently took an antihistamine, reduces the probability of sneezing. Event D, that our friend is allergic to cats, increases the probability of an allergic reaction, as does E, that a cat is present. (Whereas, for ease of exposition, the variables in our examples are binary, the de nition of qualitative in uence that follows, like most other de nitions and theorems, applies equally to multivalent discrete and continuous variables.) For the general de nition of qualitative in uences, consider a QPN with a directed edge from a to c, and optionally some other variables, collectively denoted x, with links to c. In Figure 3 , for example, x would comprise b and f. This structure dictates that the probability distribution for c can be speci ed conditionally on a and x.
De nition 1 (qualitative in uence) We An equivalent condition is that the probability density function (or mass function in the discrete case) for a given c and x, f a ( jcx), obeys the monotone likelihood-ratio property:
for all a 1 > a 2 , c 1 > c 2 , and x. This property ensures that increasing a increases the expected value of c. 3 We can replace in (1) by or =, yielding the conditions for negative in uence, S ? , or zero in uence, S 0 , respectively. S 0 means a and c are independent for all values of x. Note that the condition S + requires the inequality (1) to hold for all assignments x, and similarly for S ? and S 0 . Therefore, it is quite possible that none of the three conditions hold. The condition S ? indicates that the qualitative in uence is ambiguous or that it is not known which, if any, of the relations holds.
Probabilistic Intercausal Relations
Suppose we observe our friend sneezing, C, which raises the probability of his having a cold, A, and the probability of his having an allergic reaction, B. If we know that he is allergic to cats, D, then learning that a cat is present, E, lends con rmation of the allergic reaction B. This explains away the sneezing, and so reduces the probability of the cold, A.
This process of intercausal inference can be cast as transformation of a causal graph or QPN, illustrated in general form in Figure 4 . Again, a and b are causes of c. 
This follows directly from Bayes's rule, reversing the dependence of c on b. 4 Because it plays such a pivotal role in explaining away, we introduce terminology and notation for the intercausal relation (2). (3) Note that (3) is just the product form of (2). Thus, negative product synergy requires that the proportional increase in the probability of c 0 on raising b is smaller for higher values of a. Hence, the causal contribution of a given variable is greatest when that variable is the only active (high-valued) cause. It is this type of interaction that underlies explaining away.
We de ne positive product synergy, X + , and zero product synergy, X 0 , by substituting and =, respectively, for in (2) . Theorem 1 is also valid with either \+" or \0" substituted for \?" in both the intercausal in uence S ? and corresponding product synergy X ? . As for qualitative in uences, the negative, zero, and positive product synergies are not exhaustive. The condition X ? indicates that the product synergy is ambiguous or that it is not known which, if any, of the relations hold.
We illustrate the main result by reconsidering the two examples of explaining away.
In Figure 1 , there is a negative intercausal relation between rain, A, and the sprinkler, B, given their common e ect, wet grass, C. 
In words, the proportional increase in probability of C, wet grass, due to learning B, sprinkling, is smaller given A, rain, than given A, no rain. Or, the proportional increase in probability of sneezing due to learning that our friend has an allergy is less given a cold than given no cold. Both of these conditions seem eminently plausible| given one cause is present, the incremental e ect of the second cause is less than it would be if the rst were absent. If negative product synergy does not seem immediately compelling, one can also derive it as a generalization of the leaky noisy-or 4, 10], a plausible model for either situation. The noisy-or dictates that each of the two causes may be su cient alone to cause the e ect, and that the causal mechanisms are independent. The leakiness allows that, even if neither A nor B occurs, C may occur for another unspeci ed reason (a leak, L). It is easy to show that the leaky noisy-or relation implies negative 8 product synergy with respect to the presence of the e ect, and so leads to explaining away 16]. This result generalizes straightforwardly to cases with more than two causal variables. In contrast, noisy-nor models|where causes lead to the negation of the e ect|exhibit zero product synergy. Now let us reconsider examples for which explaining away does not seem to apply. The drinking and driving Senator from Figure 2 is one such instance. The case from Figure 3 of the two causes of an allergic reaction is another. Given that an allergic reaction, B, is observed, knowledge that our friend is allergic to cats, D, would tend to increase the probability that a cat is present, E, and vice versa. There is a positive intercausal relationship between D and E, given B. According to the positive version of Theorem 1, this relationship holds i positive product synergy applies|that is, i Pr(BjDE)
For our example, this condition says that the proportional increase in probability of an allergic reaction, due to the cat being present, is greater given that our friend is allergic to cats, then it would be if he were not. This is evident, given that the cat would have only indirect e ects, if any, if he were not allergic to cats. Therefore, the right-hand side of (5) would be at or near unity, whereas the left-hand side would be signi cantly larger.
Extensions

Dependent Causes
The premise of Theorem 1 requires that causes a and b be marginally independent.
We can generalize the result, as long as any prior dependence between the causes is in the same direction as the intercausal e ect of observing their common nding:
Theorem 2 S (a; b; G)^X (fa; bg; c 0 ; G) ) S (a; b; obs(c 0 ; G)):
For example, suppose we know our neighbor habitually listens to weather reports and turns o the sprinkler when rain is forecast. This negative prior relation between the two causes is in the same direction as the intercausal relation, and hence the tendency of the sprinkler to explain away the rain hypothesis is only strengthened.
On the other hand, suppose we believe in Murphy, the perverse raingod who likes to make it rain soon after a sprinkler has been used. This induces a positive prior dependence between the causes, rain and sprinkler. In this case the intercausal relationship after observing wet grass becomes ambiguous and cannot be determined by purely qualitative analysis. Theorem 1 also presumes that the e ect variable, c, is observed directly. Can we generalize the main result to situations where we have only indirect evidence for c? Suppose we observe the value of variable e, an e ect of c. For example, in the sprinkler model, we might observe E, cold and shiny grass. To determine the intercausal implications of this observation, we investigate the interaction relation of a and b on e when c is factored out. This situation is depicted in Figure 5 . Positive additive synergy, Y + , and zero additive synergy, Y 0 , are de ned similarly, substituting and =, respectively, for . An important di erence between additive and product synergy is that the former is de ned with respect to the variable c, rather than to a particular value c 0 |that is, the additive synergy condition holds for all values of c. The disparity is due to the distinct roles of these relations in qualitative probabilistic inference. Note, however, that when c is a propositional variable, Y (fa; bg; c) is identical to X (fa; bg; C), except in substituting addition for multiplication in (3) (or di erences for quotients in (2)). Although neither subsumes the other in general, when both of the individual in uences of each cause on the e ect have unambiguous signs (+ or ?), then there are entailment relationships between them. See 16] for a detailed exposition of these relationships.
The following result establishes (for the propositional case) that evidence positively related to the e ect maintains intercausal relations given some particular patterns of product and additive synergy. Under certain circumstances, we can generalize Theorem 3 to the case of nonpropositional c. In essence, product synergy extends from c 0 to e 0 as long as e 0 supports c 0 but does not distinguish among c 6 = c 0 . 5 For propositional c, it matters only whether the observed value e 0 was more likely given C than C.
Occam's Razor and Intercausal Reasoning
Suppose that there are several causal hypotheses|each of which could explain an observed e ect by itself|related to the nding according to a negative product synergy relationship. Given the negative intercausal relations between each pair of hypotheses given the nding, invoking one hypothesis reduces belief in the others. This process is analogous to the action of Occam's razor in slicing away hypotheses that are multiplied beyond necessity.
On the other hand, if two or more causes interact with a positive product synergy, their joint occurrence may be a more likely explanation of the nding than would be either alone. The synergistic e ects of drinking and driving, and of cat allergies and cats are two examples. We might be tempted to invoke \Occam's glue" in such cases, as the multiple hypotheses adhere together to form a coherent scenario. But perhaps it is more appealing to regard the conjunctive relation as suggesting their combination as a single compound hypothesis. Seen in this light, they are not being multiplied beyond necessity, and so not actually contravening the principle of parsimony.
Note that when there are multiple evidence variables, positive intercausal relationships and complementary hypotheses can arise even when all synergy relations are negative. Consider the QPN in Figure 6a , where three diseases|represented by Qualitative intercausal reasoning has also proven useful in the design of algorithms for quantitative probabilistic diagnosis. Because exact inference is intractable for large multiply-connected networks, there has been considerable interest in approximation algorithms. One such approach for diagnosis is to use heuristic search to nd the most probable hypotheses that can explain the observed ndings. In one large medical diagnosis application, called qmr-bn (Quick Medical Reference{Belief Network) 13], there are almost 600 diseases, and hence 2 600 potential diagnoses. However, in most cases only a tiny fraction of these diagnoses have substantial probability. Searchbased algorithms, such as TopN 5] , concentrate on the most probable hypotheses. Given the relative probabilities of the candidate diagnoses, TopN computes bounds on their absolute probabilities. The bounds may be successively narrowed as the search continues.
The key to the design of e cient search-based algorithms is an admissibility heuristic that allows them to prune subtrees that can provably lead only to hypotheses whose probability is less than some threshold. The TopN algorithm starts out by ex-amining single-disease hypotheses, extending them incrementally. Intercausal analysis can identify which additional diseases are complementary, and therefore can possibly lead to more probable hypotheses. It also reveals which diseases are competitive, and therefore can lead only to less probable hypotheses. Thus, intercausal analysis provides a suitable basis for an admissibility heuristic. Because qmr-bn uniformly assumes noisy-or relations among diseases and ndings, the diseases are always competitive. Initial results for this network, using this pruning criterion, show rapid convergence to narrow probability bounds in most cases 5]. The analysis described in this paper generalizes this approach to handle networks not only with noisy-or relations, as in qmr-bn, but with any interactions satisfying negative product synergy.
Conclusions
Intercausal relations play a central role in the combination of diagnostic and predictive reasoning. The qualitatively signi cant property of interacting hypotheses is whether they compete with or complement one another in explaining the observed ndings. In the former case, one cause explains away the other given the observation. In addition, we have shown that explaining away is not the only pattern of intercausal reasoning. To account for this distinction, we have derived a general probabilistic criterion, negative product synergy, that precisely justi es explaining away.
The main appeal of qualitative probabilistic relations is that they require minimal precision, yet capture some of the most signi cant behaviors. But qualitative probabilistic inference may be useful even for numerical systems, as a means of explanation to human users in a way that might correspond more directly to intuitive categories 6].
We also believe that it may be computationally advantageous to maintain these qualitative distinctions even when numeric information is available. As described in Section 5, intercausal relations qualitatively restrict the reasonable patterns in which to cluster events in compound hypotheses. These constraints can be exploited in diagnosis to prune the space of composite hypotheses at a high level, based on qualitative admissibility. 
